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Abstract 
 
Non-standard forms of work have a deep impact on work organisation as well as on 
workers' rights’ access and are questioning labour market institutions and labour law. 
The legal nature and the features of these news employment forms are becoming very 
complex.  
 
Enforcement become extremely difficult as it is challenging for the authorities to define 
when an employment relation is existent  
 
Considering these difficulties, the article will try to show some of the possible solutions 
in selected countries (USA, Spain, France, and Germany), focusing on the new model of 
work organisation and on the current difficulties of control/enforcement both in terms of 
gaps in legislation and in relation to identification.  
 
The article will try to conclude by providing some ideas on how to include new legal 
and practical measures to protect workers’ rights and to ensure social protection from a 
labour administration perspective, including the use of technologies to better prevent 
and improve enforcement as well as the role of social partners in a context where 
collective bargaining and social dialogue are also in crisis. 
 
Las formas atípicas de empleo tienen un gran impacto en la organización del trabajo 
así como en el acceso a los derechos por parte de los trabajadores, a la vez que 
cuestionan las instituciones del mercado del trabajo y la legislación laboral. La 
naturaleza legal y las características de estas nuevas formas son cada vez más 
complejas. El control de su aplicación es más difícil ya que las autoridades enfrentan 
retos para definir la existencia de una relación laboral. Considerando estos problemas, 
el articulo trata de mostrar algunas posible soluciones en países seleccionados ( EEUU 
España Francia y Alemania) considerando el nuevo modelo de organización y las 
dificultades de control tanto en términos de lagunas legislativas como en relación a la 
identificación de las formas 
 
El articulo intenta concluir dando algunas ideas en como incluir nuevas ideas y 
prácticas para proteger el derecho de a los nuevos trabajadores y garantizar su 
protección social desde la perspectiva de la administración de trabajo, incluyendo el 
eventual uso de nuevas tecnologías en prevención y control, así como el papel de los 
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actores sociales en un contexto en donde la negociación colectiva y le dialogo social 
están en crisis  
 
Título: Nuevas formas de trabajo e inspección laboral: Nuevos retos del “compliance” 
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The past decades have witnessed the rise of new forms of employment in both the 
industrialized and the developing world. These growths have become today an 
extending trend, or even a pattern, in the labour market. The reasons for this shift are 
multi-faceted, including increased competition as a result of globalization, technological 
change and the use of digitalisation that has facilitated business and work re-
organization, the increased participation of women in the labour market, and the rise of 
new forms of contractual flexibility, sometimes as a result of legal reforms, but also in 
response to changes in the business model. 
However, these new forms of work have a deep impact on work organisation as well as 
on workers' rights’ access. They are questioning at the same time labour market 
institutions and labour law. We could probably assert, that from regulation to 
enforcement, the existing labour rule of law is in an unprecedented crisis. 
1. The current “employment relationship” situation 
All these above-mentioned changes in the labour market have been characterised in 
practice by less contract duration and job security, more irregular working hours (both 
in terms of duration and consistency), increased use of third parties (temporary 
employment agencies and outsourcing), growth of various forms of dependent self-
employment (like subcontracting and franchising) and also bogus/informal work 
arrangements (i.e. undeclared work or any kind of arrangements deliberately outside the 
regulatory framework of labour, social protection and other laws). In parallel, these 
atypical forms have generated a dilution of the subjects of the employment relationship, 
in particular of the employer “part” of the employment contract (the employer is no 
longer an individual or group of individuals, being instead in some cases a digital 
platform). On the workers’ side, the mix in practise of independent and subordinate 
work elements in the same relationship makes the definition and identification difficult. 
This not only has an effect at the individual level (employment contract). On the worker 
side, the challenge of organising the collective voice of informal workers and those 
outside of established employment relationships, and the need to build broad-based 
coalitions with organizations with similar interests, such as cooperatives, user groups, 
traders’ associations and other civil society, membership-based organizations are 
becoming a major issue. On the employer side, the challenge of effectively representing 
the interests of SMEs and the relationship between MNEs and national employer 
organisations is key for establishing the basis for bargaining. The effectiveness of the 
negotiation depends on achieving such representation; and this has a direct impact on 
the regulation of the individual contract. 
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2. The complexity of the phenomena 
It is clear, therefore, that the new forms of work are challenging knowledge and practice 
as well as the way of understanding and regulating the employment contract. 
However, and in the first hand approach, there are several hypotheses that could be 
considered when reflecting on these new phenomena, in particular to better understand 
the regulatory and enforcement challenges. 
First, changes to work arrangements should be viewed in terms of a spectrum rather 
than simply the growth of particular categories. For example, global changes to business 
practices (including repeated rounds of downsizing/restructuring by large private and 
public sector employers), privatisation, outsourcing/offshoring and ‘converting’ 
employees into self-employer subcontractors have not only increased the number of 
workers holding shorter contract duration work. These changes have also increased job 
insecurity amongst those workers continuing to hold ongoing/permanent jobs, adversely 
affecting their health, safety and well-being. Further, the growth of atypical work 
arrangements (temporary, agency and self-employment) in combination with the 
presence of vulnerable immigrant/displaced groups (especially undocumented workers) 
appears to have increased the scope for bogus/informal work, especially in traditionally 
poorly regulated sectors like agriculture and construction. In sum, different categories of 
work interact and this can flow on to employment and working conditions so that 
simply comparing non-standard to what is deemed as standard work (as many studies 
do) will not capture the full impact of changes to work. 
Second, different dimensions of the new relationships overlap and interact in complex 
ways. For example, there is commonly a significant overlap between temporary and 
part-time work and in some industries such as construction and homecare, workers may 
move between employment and self-employment on a regular basis. Multiple 
jobholding (common in industries like hospitality) can further complicate an assessment 
on the working conditions’ status. Typically many studies only compare two or three 
different categories of work rather than the full spectrum of work arrangements. Further, 
temporary employment is quite a diverse category (including on-call, casual, seasonal, 
fixed-term contract and agency work); workers are often uncertain as to whether their 
job is temporary; and some studies have failed to control for exposure (i.e. temporary 
workers often work fewer hours than permanent workers). These complexities make 
reviews of global research difficult as well as highlighting the need for more carefully 
designed studies – not always easy given problems of access inherent with many non-
standard forms of work. 
Third, it is also critical to recognise that the growth of new forms of work has also been 
associated with significant changes in the workforce of most countries including greater 
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female participation, an ageing of the population (mainly in rich countries but also some 
middle income countries, notably China) and perhaps most important, historically 
unprecedented use of migrant workers (including internal migrants) including those on 
temporary visas (guest workers, tourists and students) and undocumented workers. 
These workers are typically concentrated in weakly unionised and poorly regulated 
sectors (like agriculture), and their vulnerability to exploitative practices is commonly 
exacerbated by language, ignorance of local laws and weaker regulatory 
entitlements/protection (the latter even applies to internal migrants in some countries). 
Undocumented migrants in particular are often found in the most precarious jobs and 
the informal sector. Of course, the categories just mentioned are not mutually exclusive 
with, for example, government reports pointing to the vulnerability of young immigrant 
workers in particularly hazardous industries like construction.  
It is also worth noting that multiservice companies have emerged with force seeking to 
elude the application of sectorial collective bargaining, whilst the requirements imposed 
on temporary employment agencies are increasingly less exigent. New ways of 
commercial collaboration between companies such as franchise agreements, maquila 
services or cooperatives are paving the way for a more flexible compliance with law and 
universally applicable collective bargaining. 
Moreover, new technologies are bringing new labour patterns and the concept of the 
worker’s physical location in an identified workplace is running out of steam. There is 
no longer any need for a chief/supervisor to be present at the workplace. It is frequent to 
work in several compatible jobs or work temporarily for different organisations using 
part-time work contracts. 
In this context, the growth of different forms of part-time work, such as mini-jobs, is 
leading to marginal jobs, lower wages and less social protection.  
It seems to be evident that the growth of more complex and dynamic work 
arrangements has opened a serious challenge to labour inspectorates in terms of 
accessing and seeking to ensure that the minimum standards are enforced. While in 
some countries government reports demonstrate some recognition of the “new” 
problem, inspectorate resourcing has typically failed to keep pace with this and in some 
cases has been cut back, in particular since the onset of the global financial crisis. The 
growth of the informal sector represents a particular challenge, especially as 
government concerns in this area are sometimes more related to the loss of tax revenue 
than labour standards. Further changes to industrial relations’ regulatory regimes that 
favour flexibility or are explicitly de-collectivist have exacerbated these challenges by 
making it harder to ensure minimum wages are paid or to ensure working hour 
arrangements are not harmful to health and living conditions.  
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3. The employment relationship related issues and the compliance issues 
Since the last two centuries, the standard or typical employment relationship has been 
characterized by an employee working under the subordination and dependence of 
another person in exchange for remuneration, resulting in a legal link being established 
between an ‘employee’ or ‘worker’ and an ‘employer’. Inherent in the employment 
relationship is the notion that the employee “does not assume the risks specific to an 
employer”.1 Moreover, in the standard employment relationship the work takes place at 
the employer’s place of business, or in any place chosen by him/her and under his/her 
direction.  
In a first attempt and in regard to legislation in force, we can identify four main distinct 
forms of atypical employment relationships: (1) dependent self-employment, (2) 
disguised employment (3) dispatched, including temporary agency, workers, and last 
but not least (4) Gig economy workers: On-demand work, crowd work.   
(1) In dependent self-employment, the worker performs services for a business or 
enterprise under a civil contract and as a result, is excluded, except if a specific 
regulation exists,2 from labour law. Dependent self-employment differs from 
independent self-employment in that the worker depends on one or a few “clients” for 
their income; thus they are economically dependent on the business that they provide 
services for, even though they are legally self-employed.  
(2) Disguised employment lends “an appearance that is different from the 
underlying reality, with the intention of nullifying or attenuating the protection afforded 
by law”.3 It can involve hiding the identity of the employer, by hiring the workers 
through a third party, or by engaging the worker in a civil, commercial contract or 
through a cooperative instead of an employment contract. On-call workers and some 
specific contracts such as key and zero hour contracts are sometimes disguised 
relationships. 
(3) Dispatched workers are contracted to work for a third party, either through a 
temporary staffing agency or a service provider, and thus form part of multiparty 
employment relationships. They are recognized as being in an employment relationship, 
but because of the different parties involved, there may be confusion regarding the 
obligations of the employer, particularly if the worker has provided services to the third-
party enterprise for an extended period of time.  
                                                           
1 ILO. 2003. The Scope of the Employment Relationship, Report V, ILC 91st Session, Geneva. Page 22. 
2 This is the case in Germany, Italy and Spain 
3 ILO, 2003 op cit, p.25. 
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(4) The gig-economy is usually understood to include two forms of work: “crowd work” 
and “work on-demand via apps”4. The first term usually refers to working activities that 
imply completing a series of tasks through online platforms. These platforms put in 
contact an indefinite number of organisations and individuals through the internet, 
potentially connecting clients and workers on a global basis. The workers are not 
covered by labour law. 
“Work on-demand via apps” is a form of work in which the execution of traditional 
working activities such as transport, cleaning and running errands, is channelled through 
apps managed by firms that also intervene in setting minimum quality standards of 
service and in the selection and management of the workforce. These are also excluded 
by labour law and not even regulated by civil or common law. 
In practice, as has already been highlighted, many of these new forms of employment 
could imply vulnerabilities/illegalities that affect the workers employed under these 
types of contract.  Some of the problems are the result of the law/regulation that 
highlight themselves the inequalities (i.e. employment insecurity). On the other hand, 
another group of vulnerabilities is the result of the conditions of performance and law 
evasion (i.e. adequate social protection/coverage). In some cases the vulnerability arises 
from both reasons. 
Let’s describe some specific situations:  
Part-time work and mini-jobs may impose vulnerabilities on workers, depending on 
whether countries abide by the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination that 
are embedded in national and international law (such as Part-Time Work Convention, 
1994 (No. 175) and the EC directive on Part-time work of 1997). In countries whose 
laws do not reflect these principles, or where there exists extreme forms of short hours 
(e.g., mini jobs), the law raises important inequalities. It is important to note that the 
incidence of part-time work has continued to grow in OECD countries in the period 
2007-2015 (from 14.6% to 15.7%), and although the incidence of temporary work fell 
sharply during the recession, it has since rebounded heavily5. 
On average, part-time workers are paid lower hourly wages than full-time workers, not 
only as a result of outright discrimination based on contractual status, but also from the 
fact that workers on part-time jobs are more likely to work in sectors and occupations 
                                                           
4 De Stefano, Valerio The rise of the "just-in-time workforce": on-demand work, crowd work and labour 
protection in the "gig-economy" ; International Labour Office, Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour 
Relations and Working Conditions Branch. Geneva: ILO, 2016 Conditions of work and employment 
series; No. 71 page 1. 
5 Recent labour market developments and the short-term outlook; OECD, Employment Outlook 2016; 
available at http://www.oecd.org/els/oecd-employment-outlook-19991266.htm 
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where hourly wages are lower; they may also be excluded from premia or overtime 
payments. This situation is a result of both (by) law and practice. Part-time workers are 
sometimes also excluded from receipt of unemployment insurance if legislation 
interprets the condition of being available for work as applying to full-time jobs only. 
Because of their part-time status and the tendency to view them as peripheral 
employment, part-time workers may also have less access to training and career 
advancement, even if the law allows the possibility. On-call work, zero-working hours’ 
contracts and similar arrangements exhibit both variable and unpredictable schedules 
where pay is uncertain. Workers on zero-hour contracts may also face employment 
insecurity in cases where the employment relationship is not recognised. In some cases, 
as in the UK, there is ambiguity as to whether workers on zero-hour contracts are (in 
UK legal terms) ‘workers’ or ‘employees’. If linked by a service provision contract with 
no mutual obligation to provide and accept hours of work, they are classified as 
“workers” and as such are not subject to protection against unfair dismissal, notice of 
termination or redundancy pay. Case law suggests that whether such protection is 
afforded depends on the reality of working arrangements rather than the wording of 
contracts. In this respect a number of zero-hours and on-call arrangements overlap with 
the “disguised employment” category. Similar problems affected the workers on the gig 
economy, where if recognised as workers they don’t have legal protection or securities. 
Vulnerability and illegality is also associated with fixed-term contracts, as workers with 
fixed-term contracts have a low expectation of continued employment, although during 
the period of contract, workers on fixed-term contracts usually cannot be dismissed 
before the contract period ends and are thus relatively well protected. They generally 
have fewer protections against unfair dismissal, as compared to permanent contracts. 
Moreover, once the end date of the contract is reached, there is no legal obligation to 
renew or extend the contract on the part of the employer.  
Workers on fixed-term contracts may suffer from inadequate social security coverage, 
mainly because of the short tenure that can lead to de facto lower unemployment 
benefits and pension provisions. They also have more limited access to on-the-job 
training, as having workers on temporary contracts decreases employers’ incentives and 
necessity to provide training, especially if the conversion rate of fixed term contracts 
into permanent contracts is low 6.  
In general, workers on project or task-based contracts are more vulnerable as compared 
to workers on fixed-term contracts.  Such workers also face significantly higher 
representation, social security coverage, and training insecurities. Indeed, project or 
task-based work often implies limited social security contributions, does not envisage 
                                                           
6 Dolado, J. J., S. Ortigueira, and R. Stucchi, 2012. Does Dual Employment Protection Affect TFP? 
Evidence from Spanish Manufacturing Firms. CEPR DP No. 8763. 
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maternity or sick leave compensation, and does not entitle workers to unemployment 
benefits.7  
Casual and daily work can be rightfully considered as the most disadvantaged type of 
temporary employment as they have no guarantee of remaining employed with the same 
employer, nor do they have right to any compensation in case of premature ending of 
the employment relationship. Moreover, unpredictability of employment is further 
translated into unpredictability of wages, or high income insecurity and inadequate – if 
extant at all – social security coverage. Similarly, training and career path insecurity is 
high. Performing tasks at different work sites and the often informal nature of 
employment raises concerns in terms of responsibility in case of accidents and work-
related injuries, implying significant insecurity in working conditions. 
The Dublin Foundation8 has recently considered the so-called employee sharing as a 
new form of employment. A good example of it is the AGZ Südbrandenburg in 
Germany, one of the oldest experiences in Europe of an employer group managing a 
cooperative labour pool. The companies participate in the cooperative and are jointly 
responsible for the employees hired by the AGZ. The workers may work in different 
companies through the cooperative on a rotating basis. The average for a single worker 
is to work in two to four companies. The workers have a contract with the AGZ and 
have equal terms of labour conditions regardless of which company they work at. The 
AGZ is a non-profit organisation and is financed by the employers group that pays 
workers’ wages, social insurance contributions and ancillary wage costs, jointly with a 
membership and management fee of about 15% of the wage costs.  
In France AdPartners, in Lyon, is another employee sharing experience. It is known as 
“portage salarial” or “umbrella company”, and gathers co-workers who are mainly 
independent executives working in consulting services for at least three years. The 
“umbrella company” takes care of clients, prepares the invoices and paperwork in 
exchange for a fee paid by workers (10% of their income). The difference with 
temporary work agencies is that the “umbrella company” does not help their co-workers 
find clients and the co-worker is not subordinated to the client. The system serves as a 
support to workers who wish to work independently but prefer to maintain some 
benefits of an employee, such as social security, sickness pay, maternity leave, 
unemployment benefits, etc. 
                                                           
7 Garibaldi, P., F. Taddei, 2013. Italy: A Dual Labour Market in Transition. Country Case Study on 
Labour Market Segmentation. ILO Employment Sector Working Paper No 144. 
8 New forms of employment report; Eurofound; Mandl et al.; available at 
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/new-forms-of-employment 
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There are other new forms of employment such as in Luxembourg the “prêt temporaire 
de main d’oeuvre” (sublease of employees) which operates as a job retention tool used 
by private companies and the government of Luxembourg in the framework of tripartite 
agreements negotiated by social partners. In Italy and Belgium there exist employment 
vouchers (in Belgium the Landelijk Dienstencoöperatief (LDC), and in Denmark there 
is the ‘boundaryless work’ or ‘flexible work’, a sort of fluid ICT-based mobile work for 
temporary project offices at the premises of clients or at home (case study of the 
company Grontmij-currently belonging to Sweco AB). 
According to other sources, “Factoo” operates in Spain, a cooperative in the region of 
Valencia that runs a platform for freelancers. The platform bills their work and presents 
VAT declarations on behalf of workers, who join the cooperative not as self-employers 
but as employees of the cooperative. The workers save the more expensive self-
employment social security contributions and enjoy the same benefits of an employee 
such as sickness pay, maternity leave, health insurance, unemployment benefits or old 
age pension. The cooperative registers them as employees in the Social Security 
General Treasury, but only for the periods in which they effectively work, obviating 
periods of inactivity9. 
In the independent self-employment, the worker is performing services for a business 
under a civil contract, thus the worker is not protected by labour law, potentially giving 
rise to a significant number of vulnerabilities. To begin with, working under a civil 
contract does not provide employment protection as the contract is for services rendered 
and thus expires at the end of the contract. Since it is not an employment contract, the 
worker does not benefit from regulations on working time, including hours and paid 
leave, or from social security protection. Contributions to a social security system are 
usually optional and the worker would contribute as independent self-employed, which 
in many countries requires a higher level of contributions than if the person were in a 
recognized employment relationship.  
There are two types of self-employment: those who freely choose self-employment and 
those who are forced into it, the latter falling very often into a sort of grey area close to 
what we know as ‘bogus’ self-employment10.  
The so-called “knowmads” is a phenomenon that is increasing with the eruption of 
electronic platforms acting as an intermediary between freelancers and clients. 
                                                           
9 Information available at http://factoo.es/.  
10Precarious Employment in Europe: Patterns, Trends and Policy Strategies; Directorate General for 
Internal Policies Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy; Study for European Parliament's 
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs; May 2016; © European Union, 2016; available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies.  
 IUSLabor 2/2017  Pablo Páramo y María Luz Vega 
11 
According to a survey carried out by McKinsey Global Institute11, there are four types 
of freelancers: a) free agents, who choose independent work and obtain their primary 
income from it; b) casual earners, who use independent work for supplemental income 
and do so by choice; c) reluctants, who make their primary living from independent 
work but would prefer traditional jobs; and d) financially strapped workers, who do 
supplemental independent work out of necessity. The report asserts that there is an 
increased demand of independent work by clients and organisations and points out that 
today 15% of independent workers use the digital platforms and markets. However, the 
report draws attention to the key challenges of this shift such as concerns related to 
benefits, income-security measures and training. Furthermore, freelance workers are 
only covered in part by social insurance, having access only to old age pensions or 
unemployment benefits according to the level of social security contributions they pay. 
Dispatched or temporary agency workers are recognized as being in an employment 
relationship and thus benefit from the protections of national labour law. There are 
geographical areas in which the posting of workers is becoming a matter of serious 
concern. Yet because they carry out their work at the premises of the contracting 
company, they are usually not entitled to receive any additional benefits that workers of 
the contracting firm may have, and their pay, particularly if they perform less-skilled 
jobs, is likely to be lower. They are less likely to have employment protection and often 
experience high job rotation, making it difficult to receive training and build career 
paths. 
On the other hand, the globalization has been the seedbed of a sharp increase of 
transnational movement of workers and a constant flood of migrants who undergo lower 
working conditions than national workers, bringing precarious employment to foreign 
workers. Dispatched workers usually provide their labour services either through a 
temporary agency or through subcontracting schemes. Despite most countries have 
regulations on both institutions, the lack of information on legal documents and the 
insufficient knowledge of language and national regulations remain as main elements 
contributing to job precariousness. 
At the European Union, posted workers of certain countries suffer low wages and 
limited labour rights as long as national standards of the host country are only partially 
implemented during the posting. Moreover, posted workers usually lack access to trade 
unions representation, have difficulties to access to translated information, often work in 
low-quality employment and do not always receive proper compensation or 
reimbursement of their travel, board and lodging expenses. 
                                                           
11 Independent work: choice and necessity and the GIG economy (Expansión, October 29th, 2016); 
http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/employment-and-growth/independent-work-choice-necessity-
and-the-gig-economy.  
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Actually, the Directives 96/71/EC of 16 December 1996, concerning the posting of 
workers in the framework of the provision of services and the so-called Enforcement 
Directive 2014/67/UE, of 15 May 2014, only guarantee a part of working conditions 
related to working time, rest periods, paid annual holidays or minimum wages. The 
proposal of 8 March 2016 for a revision of Directive 96/71/EC on the posting of 
workers (Mobility Package) aims at improving the working conditions of posted 
workers by making compatible the rights of these workers with the freedom to provide 
services in the Union, thus ensuring a level playing field for businesses. The new 
proposal seeks to lay down that all mandatory rules on remuneration in the host 
Member State apply to posted workers, including both law and universally applicable 
collective agreements in all economic sectors. 
Bogus self-employment has become a new mantra of precarious employment. In those 
places where undeclared work is not the main problem, bogus-self-employment arises 
as another form of precarious work. There are no accurate figures on the estimation of 
bogus-self-employed workers, but some surveys suggest an increase of dependent self-
employment and bogus self-employment as a precarious way of work. In countries such 
as Germany, Netherlands, Lithuania or Spain some indicators point at an increase of 
bogus self-employment12. This increase may be greater insofar the new digital platforms 
are emerging and contracting more and more workers. Sometimes the growth of bogus 
self-employment is linked to the spread of subcontracting in parallel with the increase of 
the dismissal rate in companies that release their employees but continue to work with 
them through a commercial or civil contract as self-employers. In other cases, the 
companies join to set up cooperatives that recruit workers as fake self-employers. The 
cooperative subsequently post these fake self-employers (workers) to the different work 
places of the client companies, which save social security and other costs derived from 
the application of collective bargaining13. In this case, bogus self-employment is a sort 
of disguised employment, given that its principal definitional characteristic is the 
employer’s attempt to conceal or distort the employment relationship. Workers are, 
therefore contracted through a third party via bogus self-employment contracts. Under 
bogus self-employment, the worker has the same vulnerabilities as described under 
dependent self-employment, with the added dimension that the employer’s attempt to 
deliberately conceal the employment relationship can exacerbate the insecurities that the 
worker faces. The disguised employment is also being extended to the atypical forms of 
work where the protection as already mentioned is diminished 
                                                           
12 Precarious Employment in Europe: Country Case Studies; Directorate General for Internal Policies 
Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy; European Parliament's Committee on Employment and 
Social Affairs; Andrea Broughton et al; available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies 
13 An example of this practice are the meat industries in Barcelona y Girona, in the north of Spain. 
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It is, then, clear that the legal nature and the features of these news employment forms 
are becoming very complex. There are a huge variety of forms of contracts that no 
longer include the elements that have been used for more than two centuries to define 
employment relationships by traditional (and current) labour law. Identifying the 
different elements of employment relationships and ensuring compliance with law has 
become a challenge at all levels. 
Regulation is at the heart of the emergence and spread of non-standard work in most 
countries. In some instances, the law has encouraged - either purposefully or 
unwittingly - the use of non-standard employment arrangements by facilitating or 
creating incentives for enterprises to use these arrangements. In other instances, there 
are gaps or grey areas in the law that have provided fertile grounds for their arrival. 
Enforcement become extremely difficult as it is challenging for the authorities to define 
when an employment relation is existent and therefore when social protection and 
labour law are applicable. Moreover the governance of this situation has become more 
difficult because of the lack of human and material means of the enforcement 
authorities.  
In practice, fraud and evasion in the labour market are increasing in an arithmetic 
progression and existent legislation and existent means cannot always provide solutions 
to all the regulatory gaps and therefore the possible lack of compliance. However there 
are some examples that we will analyse.  
3.1. New phenomenon: raise and plethora of the sharing economy 
As mentioned above, sharing economy shows up, in terms of different types of 
employment, either as “on-demand” work or as “crowd work”. The main characteristic 
of the sharing economy is that workers work through an electronic platform or by using 
an app for mobile phones. Both forms of working are also known as “gig-economy” and 
have particular impact on labour organisation. For instance, wages are replaced by buy 
orders, affecting a huge number of people who used to be employees and now have 
become independent workers. The “gig workers” work on punctual works (gigs) using 
all the resources of robotic and smart technology. It is becoming clear that the 
Information and Communication Technologies (ITC) are allowing a new type of labour 
relation where the mobile apps and electronic platforms are the main work tools and 
means of production.  
It is still too early to predict how the new technological framework will tailor the 
current labour relations and employment schemes, yet only one thing seems undoubted: 
the “gig economy” has burst into the market and not without controversy. The 
authorities, corporate lobbies and interest groups try to restrain the emergence of new 
platform businesses. Courts (see below) are upholding administrative and judicial 
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convictions of companies such as Uber Technologies Inc or Airbnb for breaking 
transport or labour laws. The new sharing economy companies are facing legal 
demands, social demonstrations and protests in big cities against their activities or they 
are being confronted by administrative barriers. There are countries in which new 
regulations have been adopted or could be put in place with the view to establishing a 
level playing field for taxi drivers and Uber Technologies Inc. drivers, including 
training for the latter or evaluation programmes through an internet application for taxi 
drivers (e.g. France, México or Portugal) 14. 
In Germany an online survey of over 2,180 Germans revealed that 22% of adults aged 
16-70 say they have tried to find work in the online ‘gig economy’ platforms such as 
Upwork, Uber Technologies Inc. or Handy during the past year. This percentage is 
equivalent to nearly 13 million people15. However, the authorities and corporate lobbies 
and interest groups try to restrain the emergence of new platform businesses16. 
In Denmark the Danish High Court has upheld the conviction of six Uber Technologies 
Inc drivers found guilty of breaking the country’s taxi laws, imposing fines on them of 
between 2,000 and 6,000 kroner each17.  
In France a judge imposed on Uber Technologies Inc. a fine of up to €800,000 for 
managing the UberPop service without a license18. In parallel, the French Government 
has adopted a new law (Law Macron) envisaging functional and legislative measures 
for regulating the new platforms. 
                                                           
14 Uber-pop low cost service was banned by a German Court after complaints from taxi drivers; 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/02/car-sharing-uber-ban-taxi-germany; see also: 
The Telegraph, November 19th 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/19/uber-declared-an-
illegal-taxi-service-by-danish-high-court/; Knowledge of English language at 
 (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-18/london-to-put-uber-drivers-through-english-
proficiency-testing); The Guardian, Gwyn Topham, David Hellier and Aisha Gani; Friday October, 16th 
2015;  
 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/16/uber-wins-high-court-case-taxi-app-tfl; 
Bloomberg at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-16/uber-drivers-under-criminal-
investigation-by-finland-s-police; El País at: 
 http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/08/27/opinion/1472312073_042143.html; 
 also see Forbes at http://www.forbes.com.mx/uber-sera-regulado-en-la-ciudad-de-mexico-
reuters/#gs.lbYl8jw  
15 Crowd Working Survey, November 2016, Size of Germany’s ‘Gig Economy’ revealed for the first 
time; Ursula Huws, University of Hertfordshire; Simon Joyce, University of Hertfordshire. 
 http://www.uni-europa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/crowd_working_survey_Germany.pdf  
16 Uber-pop low cost service was banned by a German Court after complaints from taxi drivers; 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/02/car-sharing-uber-ban-taxi-germany.  
17 The Telegraph, November 19th 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/19/uber-declared-an-
illegal-taxi-service-by-danish-high-court/.  
18 uber-suffers-legal-setbacks-in-france-and-germany. 
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In the UK, companies such as Uber Technologies Inc. have been working in big cities 
but facing social demonstrations and protests against its activity or confronting 
administrative barriers19. In the case of Uber Technologies Inc. the use of apps for 
mobile phones as a taximeter was declared legal after a complaint from Transport of 
London (TfL)20. However, the solicitors’ firm Leigh Day, with the support of GM 
(British Trade Union - General Municipal Boilermakers), has brought the case to the 
Central London Employment Court, which ruled last 28th October that several Uber 
Technologies Inc. drivers are not self-employed and should be paid the minimum wage 
and holidays. 
In Finland the police has recently filed a lawsuit against Uber Technologies Inc. for its 
drivers not holding a taxi license21. In Portugal a new regulation could be adopted with 
the view to establishing a level playing field for taxi drivers and Uber Technologies Inc. 
drivers, including training for the latter or evaluation programmes through an internet 
application for taxi drivers22. In Mexico a new regulation has been also announced23. 
In Spain, platforms such as Uber Technologies Inc. are emerging strongly despite some 
legal setbacks after adverse judgements ruled by Commercial Courts. Since then, 
companies such as Uber Technologies Inc. have changed the external appearance of 
their business evolving from taxi activity towards a car renting activity, although the 
Madrid Taxi Professional Federation will probably continue suing the company24. On 
the other hand, new and emerging crowd work platforms are surging in the internet 
spectrum, employing thousands of freelancers, such as Upwork25, Nubelo26, Twago27 
Freelancer28 o Infojobs freelance29. In the transport sector, new companies such as 
Cabify30 or Amovens31 are also emerging. 
 
                                                           
19 Knowledge of English language (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-18/london-to-put-
uber-drivers-through-english-proficiency-testing). 
20 The Guardian; Gwyn Topham, David Hellier and Aisha Gani; Friday October, 16th 2015;  
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/16/uber-wins-high-court-case-taxi-app-tfl.  
 
21Bloomberg; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-16/uber-drivers-under-criminal-
investigation-by-finland-s-police. 
22 El País; available at http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/08/27/opinion/1472312073_042143.html.  
23 http://www.forbes.com.mx/uber-sera-regulado-en-la-ciudad-de-mexico-reuters/#gs.lbYl8jw.  
24 http://www.expansion.com/empresas/tecnologia/2016/03/30/56fb6b3d268e3e771e8b4665.html.  
25 (https://www.upwork.com/. 
26 http://www.nubelo.com/.  
27 https://www.twago.es/.  
28 https://www.freelancer.es/.  
29 https://freelance.infojobs.net/.  
30 https://cabify.com/. 
31 https://amovens.com/.  
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In the United States Uber Technologies Inc. is facing a long and winding process of 
judicial disputes about the classification of drivers as employees or as independent 
workers. In the judgement Berwick v. Uber Technologies32 the Supreme Court of San 
Francisco has scrutinized the Uber case against the “multi-factor test Borello”33. The 
court analysed to what extent Uber activities exceeded the simple activity of an 
intermediary platform, getting directly involved in the management of the transport 
business, establishing working and control rules and finally taking profit from the 
activity’s bottom line. The Court also highlighted that the drivers could hardly be seen 
as independent workers as far as they did not carry out any managerial activity nor take 
over any investment.  
 
The Uber case in the United States (California) continued with the judgement 
O´Connor v. Uber Technologies34. In this case, the Court examined issues such as who 
takes care of the driving licence, car registration or assurance, and how the platform 
pays the drivers, how the working time is organised or how the company carries out the 
background check on drivers. While Uber Technologies Inc. held that it only followed 
up the transport from an operational point of view, not interfering in the drivers´ 
activity, the Court again turned to the Borello test for analysing the type of relationship 
between the platform and the drivers. The Court reached the conclusion that labour 
relations were evolving in accordance with the new collaborative economy and that the 
criteria set up in the Borello test were not sufficient for testing this new economic 
reality. Therefore, a redefinition of the Borello test (as well as others such as 
Martinez/IWC´s (Martinez v.Combs35)) would also be necessary. 
 
In the aftermath of the litigation, a 100 million dollar agreement between the drivers and 
the company settled the disputes36, but only apparently, as in the Judge Edward Chen-
O´Connor case, following complaints from the drivers and the San Francisco Bay Area 
                                                           
32 Superior Court of California County of San Francisco, june 16 2015, available at:  
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/historical/985/.  
33 S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc v.Department of Industrial Relations, 1989,48 Cal. 3d 341. 
34 District Court for the Northern District of Californa, available at:  
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/historical/931/  
 
35 The test Martinez/IWC´s (Martinez v.Combs) sets out three criteria for differentiating between an 
employee and an independent worker, say, a) whether the employer exercises control over the wages, 
working time and labour conditions; b) whether he suffers and permits to work; c) whether he engages, 
thereby creating a common law employment relationship; (further information at Peter Tran, Comment, 
The Misclassification of Employees and California's Latest Confusion Regarding Who is an Employee or 
an Independent Contractor, 56 Santa Clara L. Rev. 677 (2016) (available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol56/iss3/5). 
36 Información disponible en http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/06/most-drivers-in-uber-labor-case-
would-get-under-25-so-some-protest-settlement/.  
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Drivers Association the Drivers37, who questioned the agreement in June 2016 and 
rejected it in August38. The agreement allowed drivers to receive tips, payment 
calculated by kilometres and protection against unjustified cessation of activity39. The 
Judge said that the agreement could release the company from being liable of the 
drivers´ claims for minimum wages, overtime work or termination of employment 
protection. Now the parties are awaiting a decision by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in relation to the validity of the arbitration agreement40.  
 
In the European Union the “Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe” (COM (2015) 
192) stated the need to evaluate the collaborative economy41. The Communication from 
the Commission (COM (2016) 356 final, 2.6.2016) adopted “A European agenda for 
the collaborative economy42. This Agenda defines the collaborative economy as all 
companies that work with electronic platforms to sell goods or to provide services. 
 
The Agenda takes two different approaches on the collaborative economy. On the one 
hand, it describes the ‘peers-to-peers’ economy, in which users exchange goods and 
services as private individuals, and the cases in which a professional sells goods or 
provides a service to particular individuals. The Agenda provides criteria to define a 
professional service (frequency, a profit-making objective, turnover, etc.). 
On the other hand, the Agenda also lays down differences between a genuine 
information society and an information society that also acts as a service provider. The 
first one limits its action to making the platform available to the users (limited 
requirement to enter the market), while the information society as a provider of service 
gets involved in the provision of the underlying service, requiring in this case a licence 
or an authorisation. The Agenda lists some criteria to distinguish both types of 
information societies, such as who decides prices of the service or product, who settles 
                                                           
37 Drivers Slam Uber's $100M Deal To End Misclassification Suits; Matthew Guarnaccia  
Law360, New York (August 1, 2016, 7:30 PM ET) (http://www.law360.com/articles/823416). 
38 Society for Human Resource Management; https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-
compliance/state-and-local-updates/pages/uber-settlement-rejected.aspx.  
39 “Uber in Dare to Judge Says It’s Ready to Ditch Driver Deal”; Joel Rosenblatt; August 1, 2016 — 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-01/uber-in-dare-to-judge-says-it-s-ready-to-ditch-
driver-settlement.  
40 Society for Human Resource Management; https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-
compliance/state-and-local-updates/pages/uber-settlement-rejected.aspx.  
41 COM(2015) 192 final Brussels, 6.5.2015.  
42 Brussels, 2.6.2016 COM(2016) 356 final “Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions. A European agenda for the collaborative economy http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/dossier/document/COM20160356.do.  
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contract clauses, who assumes costs, who owns equipment, who decides quality 
requirements of the service. 
Finally, the Agenda brings the matter of labour relations in the collaborative economy 
into the public arena. It sets out several criteria to guide the analysis, such as whether 
there is a relationship of subordination between the employee and the employer, the 
nature of the work carried out, whether there is payment of a salary, etc. 
4. Effects of the sharing economy in labour organisation and law: change of labour 
and gaps in applicable legislation.  
In most developed countries, as explained above, there is a lack of legal and policy 
orientation with regard to the emerging forms of work provided by the new 
technologies, in particular concerning the categorization of workers, either as employees 
or as independent workers.  
Definitely, we can say that new technologies are prompting an environment of 
unstoppable growth of labour that appears to be currently out of legislative control. 
Presently, a huge number of new “freelancers” are working in the sharing economy 
platforms all around the world and frequently under hard labour conditions, low wages 
and long working times, many of them working from developing countries. The 
platforms usually lure workers into further tasks by rewarding them with points or stars 
(guarantee of future and supposedly better paid tasks) or, on the contrary, may reject 
their tasks or work done without further justification.  
At any rate, the scope of a new legal framework should be broad enough to cope with 
issues such as protection of fair competition, clients and workers. A first step in this 
direction has been taken by the Law Macron in France, which has reinforced the 
information obligations between the platforms and the clients. According to this law, 
both the service providers and the owners of the platform must supply clear and 
transparent information (art. 134). The law requires the platforms to provide detailed 
information on the service, the different offers on line, civil and fiscal rights, obligations 
of the different parties involved and information about the professionals, service 
providers and consumers who use the platform43.  
 
The “sharing economy is transforming the society”, is a “huge opportunity to foster 
competition” and it is advisable to suppress unnecessary and disproportionate legal 
restrictions in the current legislation, in particular in sectors such as transports and 
                                                           
43 L121-17 Code de la consommation. Comments at Economie de partage et loi Macron : nouvelles 
obligations pour les plateformes collaboratives; Mélanie Defoort, see: 
 http://www.village-justice.com/articles/Economie-partage-loi-
Macron,20242.html#biqidtirDKbGtZp6.99.  
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accommodation44. However, in the field of labour relations some studies45 show that 
labour organisation in the era of new technologies presents quite a few handicaps such 
as dispersion on the internet, absence of work place, difficulties for inspection and 
control, little chances to join trade unions for fear of being fired46, low wages47, risks 
linked to child work or work of disabled workers, lack of social protection”48 or lack of 
security concerning income49. 
                                                           
44 Spanish National Commission for Markets and Competition (CNMC) ; available at 
https://www.cnmc.es/CNMC/Prensa/TabId/254/ArtMID/6629/ArticleID/1684/La-CNMC-somete-a-
consulta-p250blica-las-Conclusiones-preliminares-del-estudio-sobre-los-nuevos-modelos-de-
prestaci243n-de-servicios-y-la-econom237a-colaborativa.aspx.  
45 “Transformation numérique et vie au travail”, Rapport établi par M. Bruno METTLING (A l’attention 
de 
Madame la ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi, de la Formation Professionnelle et du Dialogue Social); pg. 
12; available at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/154000646/. 
De Stefano, Valerio; “The rise of the "just-in-time workforce" : on-demand work, crowdwork and labour 
protection in the "gig-economy"/International Labour Office, Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations 
and Working Conditions Branch. -Geneva: ILO, 2016 Conditions of work and employment series; No. 
71), pág.10; available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---
travail/documents/publication/wcms_443267.pdf. 
 46 Although there are web pages where crowd workers can obtain information about their labour 
conditions, such as Fair Crowdwork hosted by the German union IGM (Industriegewerkschaft Metall); 
available at: http://www.faircrowdwork.org/de/debatte/wir-sind-dynamo-gemeinsame-aktionen-
f%C3%BCr-crowd-worker. There are also new information platforms for crowd workers such as 
TurkerNation (http://turkernation.com/) or MTurkGrind (http://www.mturkgrind.com/). Recently the 
company UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC. has promoted in New York a company-funded guild for drivers 
(Independent Drivers Guild); Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-27/uber-
found-an-unlikely-friend-in-organized-labor) in an attempt to thwart unionization of drivers. 
47 In the web On-demand Society (http://www.ondemandsociety.com/piecemeal-jobs-and-breadcrumb-
salaries/), a platform for freelancers, it is mentioned that 90 % of tasks for Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
are paid an average of 4.80$ per hour, low wage compared with a US federal mínimum wage per hour of 
7,25$ or the US average salary per hour of 25.73 $ (BLS, August 2016 (available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t19.htm#ces_table3.f.p). 
48At the web pages of the IRS, Internal Reveneu Service, y SBA (Small Business Administration, US) 
differences between the so-called “workers 1099” and employees are 
explained:https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contractor-self-
employed-or-employee 
https://www.sba.gov/starting-business/hire-retain-employees/hire-contractor-or-employee. 
Lack of social protection and undeclared work are paramount issues, as long as most of the internet 
service providers consider their workers as independent workers and do not register the in the general 
social insurance. In an attempt to reduce this lack of protection there are companies as UBER that are 
trying a so-called Individual Retirement Account including insurance funds and fiscal benefits for drivers 
(available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-lets-drivers-hail-an-ira-with-betterment-
1472043939?mod=mktw).  
49 Many workers of the “gig-economy” do not find quickly available work in the internet platform or 
there is a poor communication between them and clients (requesters) or the platforms. Further 
information at “Income security in the on-demand economy: findings and policy lessons from a survey of 
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At this point, we may ask ourselves what should be the way forward. It seems clear that 
traditional national standards may not be sufficient to regulate the new emerging forms 
of work and in particular the right classification of crowd or on-demand workers. We 
have seen how in the US the traditional tests for labour relations are failing in that 
classification. The judgement O´Connor vs Uber unveils that the new reality may not fit 
into the traditional labour framework and that the idea of building up a new intermediate 
category of workers is permeating the analysis of more than one jurist and researcher 
(e.g. Patrick Cotter v.LYFT, INC., Tribunal Distrito Norte de California, Caso No. 13-
cv-04065-VC, marzo 2015)50. 
 
For the time being, in the new forms of employment the classification of workers either 
as independent workers or as employees must be carried out on a case-by-case basis. 
The classification may be relatively easy in certain sectors such as food, delivery, social 
care and cleaning, in which the presence, in some cases after judicial litigation, of the 
labour elements is more visible. However, in other sectors such as transport or crowd 
work in platforms the approach may be more difficult. It is here where the borderline 
between the concept of employee and independent worker still remains very unclear and 
subject to confusion between genuine self-employment and bogus self-employment. 
Nonetheless, several countries have adopted intermediate solutions for cases where the 
special characteristics of the relationship between employer and worker do not meet the 
basic elements of the traditional labour relation. In this respect, some analysts take the 
stance that “it is not possible to behold self-employment as a single and homogeneous 
reality, from both a sociological and a legal point of view” (e.g. Cruz Villalón, 201351).  
In this context, it is important to examine to what extent all these new forms of 
employment and work could be included within the scope of the labour contract or 
whether it should be more convenient to resort to a new legal framework enclosing 
elements that cover specific characteristics such as casualness, ubiquity, flexibility, job 
                                                                                                                                                                           
crowdworkers / Janine Berg ; International Labour Office, Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations 
and Working Conditions Branch. - Geneva: ILO, 2016 (Conditions of work and employment series; No. 
74); page 5.  
Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---
travail/documents/publication/wcms_479693.pdf.  
50 http://adapt.it/adapt-indice-a-z/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Cotter_Lyft.pdf.  
51 “El Trabajo autónomo económicamente dependiente en España. Breve valoración de su impacto tras 
algunos años de aplicación”; Jesús Cruz Villalón, President of Spanish Labour Law Association, 
Catedrático de Derecho del Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social, Universidad de Sevilla, Documentación 
Laboral; Nº 98, 2013; pág.3 in internet available at: 
https://idus.us.es/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11441/41506/TRABAJO%20AUT%C3%93NOMO%20ECON
%C3%93MICAMENTE%20DEPENDIENTE%20EN%20ESPA%C3%91A%20%20D%20179.pdf?sequ
ence=1.  
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sharing, etc. The new forms of work in the electronic platforms are far from the 
traditional jobs. At this regard, the European Economic and Social Committee held last 
March an audience52 in which the discussions about the new forms of work and sharing 
economy focused on problems such as fair wages or fundamental rights and social 
protection. The meeting brought up new proposals such as benefits’ portability, concept 
of an intermediate category of worker or a new reading of basic conditions for the 
workers of the sharing economy. 
 
In Europe, for instance, the dependent self-employer has gained steam over the last few 
years53 as a hybrid between the employee and the genuine self-employer. New ideas are 
emerging, such as for instance the so-called “fully portable safety net based on 
Individual Security Accounts” for crowd workers54, in which the different platforms 
could transfer wages and a part of social insurance costs allowing employees to qualify 
for pensions (age, unemployment, etc.). 
The particular characteristics surrounding the “gig workers” (working time flexibility, 
telework, availability, etc.) make it extremely difficult to regulate aspects such wages, 
working overtime, task-wage, time-wage criteria, etc. It is thus necessary to analyse 
what exactly is the relationship of dependence and subordination between employer and 
employee in the sharing economy and electronic platforms. It is equally unavoidable to 
take an approach in relation to who owns the means of production or working tools. The 
European Agenda has taken first steps in the definition of criteria, and at national level 
several countries’ policy makers are claiming a regulation that envisage the working 
conditions of workers in the gig economy55. 
 
                                                           
52 The changing nature of employment relationships and its impact on maintaining a living wage-;Public 
Hearing - European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), VMA building, room VMA 3, 2 rue van 
Maerlant, 1040 Brussels, Belgium; ver en http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.events-and-activities-
changing-nature-employment-relationship.  
53 DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT A: 
EMPLOYMENT POLICY; Social protection rights of economically dependent self-employed workers; 
Study for European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs; Eichhorst, Werner et al. 
See also for Italy http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/working-conditions-
labour-market-law-and-regulation/italy-economically-dependent-self-employed-work-in-the-jobs-act; see 
for Spain http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/es/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-
contributions/spain/spain-self-employed-workers.  
54 Steven Hill, New Economy, new social contract, A plan for a safety net in a multiemployer world, 2015 
New America, August 2015, pg. 9. 
55 For instance in the UK the Labour Party presented the New Clause 24; available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/uber-judgment-workers-rights-minimum-wage-holiday-
pay-london-uk-a7385591.html.  
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5. Labour administration versus new form of work: enforcement current problem, 
experiences.  
There is growing evidence that a great portion of employees will telework from home in 
the next years and that the traditional working day 9.00-17.00 commute-to-the-office 
job is eroding56. New technologies will thus place pressure on labour relations insofar as 
they may be used improperly to circumvent the law on labour or to disguise an 
employment relationship. Currently, new technologies today provide employers with 
numerous tools to divide tasks and entrust them to workers, who may fulfil them from 
home. Hence, this work from home is rarely subject to inspection. For instance, it is not 
easy at all for labour inspection to check whether workers working from home are 
registered with social security, as it is hardly possible to carry out checks related to 
working time because workers are only subject to telematics’ supervision by the 
employer. At the same time, new forms of part-time work make inspections more 
difficult as the working timeframe is not clearly defined. 
In the years to come, labour inspection will need to be up-to-date in all related new 
technologies, web domains, cloud computing, electronic signatures, etc. For this reason, 
labour inspection needs to invest in training and qualified staff, including special teams 
integrated by inspectors and IT experts. For instance, crowd work employers, 
cooperatives of fake self-employers or fictitious companies may misuse new 
technologies by abusing the trust of workers by requiring them to transfer their 
electronic signature for managing all types of improper administrative procedures, such 
as undue applications of social benefits, work permits, etc. Furthermore, there are new 
softwares capable of tampering with machinery and work equipment or digital devises 
that miscalculate work time or work environment clouding data or information. Labour 
inspection has the challenge of fighting these virtual fraudulent practices and 
combatting undeclared work or precarious employment in the cloud. 
Equally, the so-called “smart working” is emerging strongly. The new work places are 
airports, trains, waiting rooms and home. The work equipment are portable computers, 
smartphones or tablets that allow working anywhere and anytime. The new millennial 
workers are “ubiquitous workers”, who are permanently interconnected and tele-
operating, thereby working with ever seen flexibility. Many questions rise in relation to 
these new forms of work. How may working time be subject to control? What are the 
risks related to health and safety at work? How may the regulations on daily or weekly 
rest or holidays be complied with? How should an accident at work be defined? How 
can workers conciliate private life with work? Is it necessary to undertake a new 
                                                           
56 London Business School’s Global Leadership Summit: available at https://www.london.edu/news-and-
events/news/majority-will-work-remotely-by-2020-say-executives#.WEkdfelTFjo.  
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regulation that provides for the switch-off right? Some institutions57, large multinational 
companies and collective bargaining agreements58 have already started to tackle the 
subject and take measures. 
A discussion paper edited by OSHA-EU in 2015 emphasises that crowd work may 
entail physical risks (ergonomic, safe use of screens and laptops, etc.), psychosocial 
risks (pressure, tight deadlines, interruptions, lack of sickness pay, etc.). It also draws 
attention to certain unsolved issues such as the status of crowd workers, who is the 
employer, how insurance and liability are schemed, how consumers and public safety is 
protected, and how Directives on Working Time, Part-Time Work, Temporary Agency 
Work and Directive on Health and Safety in Fixed-Term and Temporary Employment 
(91/383/EEC) will apply to crowd work59. 
The so-called hyper-connected working life is already being tackled in some countries. 
As from 1st of January, France has put in place a new regulation envisaging the right to 
switch-off of all workers60. 
In this context, Labour Inspection needs to continuously update and modernise, which 
will require improving efficiency in combating fraud and undeclared work derived from 
the undue use of new technologies. Labour inspection has to address the challenge of 
dealing with deregulation situations as long as the labour market is evolving quicker 
than the law. On the other hand, the sharing economy platforms usually have an 
international dimension, which poses aggregate difficulties linked to the capabilities of 
the authorities to display its control and enforcement powers. In this context, the 
Directive e-Commerce 2000/31/CE could serve as a first-hand guidance in order to 
identify the platforms’ direction and control centres, but greater cooperation between 
countries is essential. 
 
The challenges that the new forms of work and crowd work present are of the outmost 
importance in the enforcement of labour law. Labour inspection is at the heart of the 
                                                           
57 For instance, the Politecnico de Milano has opened an Observatory Smart Working; available at 
http://www.osservatori.net/smart_working. 
58The report Mettling encloses some experiences such as the agreement in 2014 of Syntec, Cinov39, 
CFDT y CFE-CGC in France; Volkswagen with a new surveillance system of the smartphones servers 
within a certain time frame, or Daimler-Benz with a device for e-mails (Transformation numérique et vie 
au travail, Rapport établi par M. Bruno METTLING (A l’attention de Madame la ministre du Travail, de 
l’Emploi, de la Formation Professionnelle et du Dialogue Social); pg.23; available at 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/154000646/.  
59 Discussion Paper; “A review on the future of work: online labour exchanges, or “crowdsourcing”: 
implications for occupational safety and health”; available at https://osha.europa.eu/en/oshwiki/review-
future-work-online-labour-exchanges-or-crowdsourcing.  
60Expansión, 4th January, 2017. 
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technological tsunami and must draw the attention of policy makers for working on 
innovative regulations that cover the specific characteristics of the new forms of work. 
Nevertheless, until these regulations are in place, labour inspection should work in the 
identification of the emerging labour brokers. It should be capable of inspecting the 
electronic collaborative platforms, combating fraud in a framework of lack of 
regulation, strong competition, transnational dimension, difficulties of inspection related 
to working time, new forms of employment and recruitment, easy dismissals, low 
wages, etc.  
Labour inspectors must receive specific training in order to be effective in the detection 
of these platforms and in the identification of workers, investigating whether these 
platforms are service providers or information societies. Labour inspectors must be 
capable of testing who owns the work tools and analysing how the relationship is 
established between the client, the workers and the platform or the intermediaries.  
For instance, the inspection of on-demand (transport) platforms requires looking at how 
the vehicle is selected, who owns it, who takes care of the car licence, registration and 
the insurance, who provides the smartphone and GPS equipment. Labour inspection 
must anticipate changes and should position itself on the front-line of the problem, 
striving for guaranteeing the respect of decent working conditions for crowd and on-
demand workers, and should be heard by policy makers where these decide to regulate 
the new forms of work.  
The 5th ASEAN Labour Inspection Conference organized in Yogyakarta last November 
2015 shows the way forward for labour inspectorates. It underscores the need to 
strengthen labour inspection capability and capacity through ICT, regional and bilateral 
cooperation for the development of national ICT plans and systems for labour 
inspection including technology transfer and technical advice, and to enhance 
cooperation among countries particularly in labour inspection system through ICT61. 
Another challenge is that inspections will have to concentrate on the non-standard and 
precarious forms of employment, where trade union presence is limited. In this respect, 
precarious work should not be associated with a lack or shortage of labour inspection 
resources or with the low efficiency rate of enforcement systems. In general, the 
question of number of inspections is not as relevant as the issue of the efficiency of the 
labour inspection system. Enforcement systems must not only address the issue of 
prosecution and sanction, but also serve as a key information resource. 
Enforcement systems should not be limited to conventional prosecution schemes, but 
they should also promote and follow-up good industrial relations and collaboration with 
                                                           
61 The 5th ASEAN Labour Inspection Conference was organized from 11 to 12 Nov 2015 in Yogyakarta 
with the theme of "Enhancing Labour Inspection through Information and Communication Technology". 
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trade unions, self-auditing systems and social responsibility in companies, insofar as 
employers prefer to gain the prestige and credibility that provides the security of 
standard working conditions in their work places. 
To sum up, labour inspection needs to adapt to the new technological changes, growing 
sharing economy and precarious employment. It will need to tackle the new forms of 
precarious work and shadow economy that may grow in all corners of the new cyber 
physical industry 4.0, the digital industrial revolution. Labour inspectors will need to 
become familiar with large data management, the use of electronic files and signatures, 
smart factories, large logistic and electronic platforms, remote work and gig economy. 
Digitalisation will bring a new way of understanding human relations and therefore 
labour relations, and labour inspection should effectively play its key role as guarantor 
of the new law. 
6. Conclusions: a way forward.  
As was shown in the present analysis, the heterogeneity and dispersion of the 
phenomena makes it difficult for the compliance actor and enforcement authorities to 
act according to traditional routes. Workers in this kind of jobs are not working either in 
standard hours, in standard work places and are not even regulated by clear and well 
defined laws ( social security rights are not clearly defined in some cases for instance) . 
Moreover, in some particular forms of work the “supervision” task and the authorisation 
of leave and some other compensatory rights are given to the platforms. 
At the collective level nonstandard workers have reservations and/or resistance to the 
intervention to the formal unions (considered as outsiders and not understanding the real 
nature of their particular work). However recent developments prove that in the long 
term this new contractual arrangement will only provide a lose-lose situation without 
getting any real benefits in the medium term. 
Social partners’ participation has proven some success in addressing the needs of 
workers and employers to improve compliance, in particular through raising awareness 
and increasing better understanding. The need of protection at an early stage could 
guarantee a better perception of rights and protection needs. It seems clear that 
fundamental shifts in policies and regulations are required in relation to these particular 
forms of work. Historically full employment policies discourage precarious/nonstandard 
work by increasing the bargaining power of labour. However, this no longer seems to be 
the situation. 
Besides the gaps in law, enforcement authorities are poorly resourced and without 
enough effective power to carry out the task (moreover in the new technologies world). 
Many standard employment situations occur in the context of subcontracting networks 
and supply chains, and this implies even new techniques of intervention and addresses 
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categories of work in special conditions of isolation. CSR have tried to solve some of 
the problems of this particular situation but there is still an important problem related to 
law enforcement in practice. 
Even with these difficulties we need to have a positive approach when addressing our 
future; Inspectorate are aware of the challenge and are working hard in founding 
approaches and solutions to the new challenge. Coordination among authorities and 
cooperation with social partners to look for fraud have always been the means to 
achieve results. Training and adapt investigation methods should be the base of progress 
and collaboration at international level, and could be a source of information and 
improvement. 
Enforcement authorities have not only the role of supervision of compliance but also the 
role of advising, educating and preventing, and this is key to avoid vulnerability and 
lack of protection. A more structure role in avoiding precarity should be included in the 
inspection policies at national and international level and this is the first step. 
Last but not least, OSH-related issues should specially be considered when dealing with 
nonstandard forms of work. The nonstandard workers will be severely affected by the 
lack of protection and social security coverage as well as not being beneficiaries of 
prevention policies and training. 
 
 
 
 
